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In recent years Russia has launched a concerted effort to undermine pro-Western regimes
in the former Soviet area by using economic sanctions. Most studies of this economic
offensive have focused on Russia's obvious use of natural gas as a political weapon. This
paper adds to that literature by showing how the Kremlin in fact uses many kinds of
sanctions simultaneously. The case of Georgia illustrates this clearly. To undermine Pres-
ident Saakashvili Moscow used not only energy sanctions, but also trade and ﬁnancial
sanctions, as well as restrictions on Georgian migrant workers. As this case shows, dem-
ocratic regimes may be particularly vulnerable to such economic sanctions, since even a
relatively small economic decline can cause an incumbent to lose an election. The Russian
effort in Georgia seems to have succeeded, as Saakashvili's party was driven from ofﬁce in
the 2012 and 2013 elections by Georgian Dream, a new coalition founded by Bidzina
Ivanishvili, a billionaire who made his fortune in Russia. However, Ivanishvili has now
found that he, too, faces Russian economic pressure.
Copyright © 2015, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Production and
hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction and theory
The former President of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili,
was widely seen as a thorn in the side of the Kremlin. Along
with the leaders of the Baltic States and the former Ukrai-
nian President, Viktor Yushchenko, he was ﬁrmly pro-
Western and consistently attacked Moscow. In Saakashvi-
li's case, the word ‘attack’ is not meant only as a metaphor.
Georgian troops invaded the breakaway province of South
Ossetia in the summer of 2008, precipitating a brief war
with Russia which ended badly for the Georgians.
After years of conﬂict, Russia was very pleased by the
results of the October 1, 2012 parliamentary elections in
Georgia. To the surprise of many observers, Saakashvili'sarch Center, Hanyang
nter, Hanyang University. ProdUnited National Movement (UNM) was defeated by an
upstart coalition known as “Georgian Dream.” This new
group was led by a mysterious multi-billionaire who had
made his fortune in Russia before returning to Georgia,
Bidzina Ivanishvili. While Saakashvili retained the presi-
dency for another year, his inﬂuence was sharply curtailed,
as his opponents controlled parliament and could appoint a
new Prime Minister and cabinet. The deﬁnitive end of the
Saakashvili period came on October 27, 2013, when presi-
dential elections were helddelections inwhich Saakashvili
was unable to run, having already served two terms in of-
ﬁce. His party was trounced, with its candidate receiving
just under 22 percent of the vote. The Georgian Dream
candidate, Giorgi Margvelashvili, dominated with over 62
percent.11 Delany, Max, and Irakli Metreveli, “Georgian PM Ally Revels in Big
Win at Presidential Poll,” Agence France Press, October 28, 2013.
uction and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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defeat of Saakashvili's party in 2012 and 2013. While there
were certainly other factors in the election results, as will
be noted below, the paper will argue that Russian sanctions
played an important role in undermining his presidency. As
was seen in the Ukrainian case, where the anti-Russian
president, Yushchenko, was ousted in a 2010 election, the
Russians used punitive energy price increases and supply
embargoes to weaken the Georgian economy.2 In contrast
to the Ukrainian case, however, in dealing with Georgia the
Kremlin relied more on other types of sanctions. As we
shall see, these included a variety of trade and ﬁnancial
measures, ranging from banning Georgian exports (such as
wine, fruit and mineral water) to restricting the ability of
Georgians to work in Russiada hard blow to a small, weak
economy which relies heavily on remittances fromworkers
in foreign countries.
I believe that cases such as this are actually quite com-
mon in International Relations. For the sake of simple,
parsimonious explanations, much literature on sanctions
focuses on only one instrument at a timedfor example
trade embargoes or ﬁnancial sanctions.3 While in some
cases it may be possible to focus on one sanctiondsuch as
the international embargo on oil exports imposed on Sad-
dam Hussein of Iraq from 1991 to 2003dmany other cases
involve multiple instruments. Such cases may be harder to
study, but they are important to understand if we want to
gain an accurate picture of the role of sanctions in today's
world. I argued this in my paper on the US-led “Coalition of
theWilling” in the Iraq war, written for International Studies
Perspectives in 2008.4 Washington used a wide variety of
sanctions and incentives to help forge that coalition,
ranging from threats to close military bases in Germany to
offers to hire guest workers from the Philippines, and from
promises of Iraq reconstruction contracts to Poland to
threats to boycott French wine exports. TodayMoscow uses
a similar variety of carrots and sticks to inﬂuence its
neighbors.
The Georgian economy wasdand remainsdvery
vulnerable to Russian sanctions. This can be clearly by the
criteria which experts use to predict sanctions success.5
First, the Georgian economy is vastly smaller and weaker
than that of Russia. While Russia's GNP is currently esti-
mated at about 2 trillion dollars, Georgia's stands at only 16
billion, about 125 times smaller.6 Similarly, Georgia's trade
turnover is a rounding error compared to that of its larger
neighbor, with Georgian exports in 2012 estimated at $3.3
billion and Russia's at $530 billion, about 160 times larger.2 Newnham, Randall, “Pipeline Politics: Russian Energy Sanctions and
the 2010 Ukrainian Elections,” Journal of Eurasian Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2
(July 2013), 115e122.
3 See such classic works on sanctions as Baldwin, David, Economic
Statecraft. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985; and Hufbauer,
Gary, et al., Economic Sanctions Reconsidered (3rd Ed.). Washington, DC:
Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2007.
4 Newnham, Randall, “Coalition of the Bribed and Bullied? U.S. Eco-
nomic Linkage and the Iraq War Coalition,” International Studies Per-
spectives, Vol. 9, No. 2 (May 2008), 183e200.
5 See for example Baldwin and Hufbauer, Ibid.
6 Data in this paragraph, all 2012 estimates, are from CIA World Fact-
book, www.cia.gov, and own calculations.Additionally, Russia enjoys a hefty trade surplusdabout
$200 billion in 2012dwhile Georgia's imports are double
its exports, leaving it with a large trade deﬁcit ($3.3 billion).
Russia's GNP per capita is estimated to be three times that
of Georgia's (roughly $18,000 versus $6,000) and its un-
employment rate is about three times lower (5.7% versus
15.1%). All of these factors make it relatively easy for Russia
to use economic leverage against the Georgians. Clearly any
disruption caused by trade or ﬁnancial sanctions will be
insigniﬁcant for Russia, but highly painful to the small,
weak Georgian economy. As we shall see in more detail in
the sections to follow, Georgia's overall economic weakness
is mirrored in more speciﬁc areas, including energy, trade
and migration.
Georgia's economic dependency is further deepened by
a second factdits geographic location. Georgia borders on
Russia, and has few other strong neighbors it can turn to as
economic alternatives. As we shall see, Azerbaijan was able
to provide Tbilisi with useful energy resources. Yet in other
ways, the small, poor states abutting Georgia to the south
and east are not terribly useful economic partnersdfor
example, they cannot match Russia in providing many jobs
for Georgianworkers or largemarkets for Georgian exports.
For example, while Turkey is now Georgia's largest trading
partner it is too small to purchase as much as Russia, and
trade has also been hampered by the lack of an easy route
over the harsh mountains separating the countries.7
Finally, a third important factor is that, due to their
shared history in the Russian Empire and Soviet Union,
economic ties were built up for many years between Russia
and Georgia, both through deliberate government policy
and through natural economic evolution. Such long-
established ties are costly to break. Both Czars and Com-
missars feared that Georgia, like other parts of the Russian/
Soviet empire, might be tempted to veer away from Mos-
cow's control. This fear seemed justiﬁed when the Geor-
gians brieﬂy gained their independence in the Russian Civil
War of 1917e21. In all of the economic areas we will con-
siderdenergy supplies, trade, and labor migrationdthe
well-established ties with Russia became strong vulnera-
bilities for the Georgians when they tried to defy Moscow's
wishes.
How, though, does the Georgia case ﬁt into the broader
literature on economic sanctions? This case helps to
conﬁrm an important theory in the study of economic
leverage: democracies may be more vulnerable to sanc-
tions than autocracies. There are several reasons for this.
First, democratic leaders must keep the support of a ma-
jority of citizens to stay in power. Autocrats can make do
with a much smaller ‘winning coalition.’8 If sanctions harm7 The two sides are working hard to change this: a railroad link, the
Baku-Tbilisi-Kars line (BTK) is under construction and is now scheduled
to be completed soon. Sam Applegate, “First Test Train on BTK Railway,”
MENA Rail News, January 30, 2015 (www.menarailnews.com).
8 See for example Risa Brooks, “Sanctions and Regime Type: What
Works, and When?” Security Studies, Vol. 11 No. 4 (2002), 1e50; Susan
Allen, “The Determinants of Economic Sanctions Success and Failure,”
International Interactions, Vol. 31 No. 2 (2005), 117e138; David Lektzian
and Mark Souva, “An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onset and Suc-
cess,” Journal of Conﬂict Resolution, Vol. 51 (2007), 848e871.
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be at risk, while autocrats can more easily protect a small
group of favored supporters and ignore the suffering of the
general public.9 Second, autocrats have ample control
mechanisms to prevent the spread of discontent. They can
rely on state-run news media to cover up any economic
problems, control of both businesses and police to punish
dissenters, and compliant election ofﬁcials to rig any votes
which are allowed. Third, related to this, the costs and risks
associatedwith opposing an incumbent government are far
lower in a democracy. Voting in a well-run election, with a
secret ballot, is very easy. As I noted in a 2013 paper, the
economic theory of elections, one of the most well-
established in American Government and Comparative
Politics, establishes that there is a clear relationship be-
tween economic performance and the vote for incumbent
parties.10 Thus even a small economic impact caused by
sanctions may well be enough to cause a leader to lose a
democratic election, while the same sanctions would cause
few problems for an autocratic leader. While it is difﬁcult to
calculate the exact damage to Georgia caused by Russian
sanctions, they clearly had a signiﬁcant impact. And given
Georgia's fragile economy, even a moderate impact was
politically important. As we shall see, commentators
agreed that economic issuesdsuch as chronically high
unemploymentdwere important in the defeat of Saa-
kashvili's movement.
This paper will proceed as follows. First we will brieﬂy
examine the history of Georgia's Rose Revolution, showing
how Mikhail Saakashvili provoked Moscow's wrath. Next,
wewill consider several of the economic levers the Kremlin
used to ﬁght the Georgian leader. These included energy
sanctions, trade sanctions, and sanctions against Georgian
workers in Russia. Finally, the paper will attempt to link
these sanctions to the electoral defeat of Saakashvili's
movement in 2012 and 2013. In the end, we will see that
the Georgian case offers important lessons, both for Rus-
sia's ‘near abroad’ and for the world as a whole.2. The Rose Revolution: a challenge to Moscow
In November 2003 Georgian President Eduard She-
vardnadze was toppled by the so-called ‘Rose Revolution.’
The overthrow was part of a series of ‘Color Revolutions’
taking place at the time, which were seen by Putin's9 In fact, some cases seem to show that sanctions actually strengthen
an autocrat's hold on power. For example, pro-regime groups may be
given control over smuggling goods made scarce by sanctions. This
technique was used by both Saddam Hussein and the Iranian leadership
when sanctions were imposed on them by the West. In Iran the Repub-
lican Guard became a favored economic actor, both strengthening that
group and binding it more closely to the clerical leadership. Conversely,
those critical of the regime can be punished by being forced to bear the
brunt of any sanctions. Thus, for example, both Zimbabwe and North
Korea have kept scarce food away from less supportive regions of their
countries, letting many starve.
10 Newnham (2013). See also Nikolay Marinov, “Do Economic Sanctions
Destabilize Country Leaders?” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.
49, No. 3 (2005), 564e576. Marinov shows statistically that when their
countreis are sanctioned democratic leaders are more likely to lose ofﬁce
than non-democratic ones.government as directed by the West and aimed at Russia.
First, in 2000, Moscow's ally Slobodan Milosevic was
overthrown in Serbia. Similar uprisings took place in the
Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, and Lebanon. These revolutions not
only harmed Moscow by overthrowing friendly regimes.
They also could be, Putin feared, a model for a similar up-
rising in Russia itselfdas was ultimately seen in the large
(but unsuccessful) ‘Snow Revolution’ demonstrations
against Putin in the winter of 2011e12.
When Mikhail Saakashvili assumed power in Georgia in
January 2004, the Kremlin initially hoped for a stable
transition. Indeed, Putin's envoy, Igor Ivanov, reportedly
played a role behind the scenes in negotiating a peaceful
exit for Shevardnadze.11 However, Saakashvili soon proved
to be one of the most outspoken anti-Russian leaders in the
former Soviet space. He demonstratively sided with
American President George Bush, greatly expanding Geor-
gia's role in the so-called “Coalition of the Willing” and
sending many Georgian troops to ﬁght in Iraq and
Afghanistan.12 Indeed, as other nations withdrew, he
insisted on increasing his country's presence in Iraq. By
mid-2008 2,300 Georgian troops were there, making tiny
Georgia America's second most important partner in the
country, behind only Great Britain.13 He lobbied hard for
Georgia to be included in both the EU and NATO. And he
invited Bush to Tbilisi in May 2005, at a time when much of
the worlddeven many American alliesdwere shunning
him over the Iraq conﬂict. Indeed, the Georgian capital is
now the only place in the worlddincluding the U.S.dto
have a major street named after George W. Bush.14
Saakashvili was also a thorn in Moscow's side on issues
closer to home. He was a strong critic of Russia's actions in
Chechnya, where the Kremlin was attempting to crush an
Islamic insurgency. Many in Russia believed that Tbilisi was
turning a blind eye to insurgents operating out of remote
Georgianmountains which bordered Chechnya. Saakashvili
also stepped up pressure on several secessionist enclaves
within Georgia, all supported by Moscow. In one case-
dAdjara, in Georgia's southwest, bordering Tur-
keydSaakashvili was able to restore Georgian government
control. Such was not, however, the case for the other two
regions, both bordering Russia in the north of Georgia. In
both South Ossetia and Abkhazia Russia had stationed
‘peacekeeping troops’ since the 1990s to bolster the
breakaway regimes. Saakashvili stepped up a campaign of
saber-rattling against them.
Saakashvili's deﬁance peaked in the summer of 2008
with open warfare, the ﬁrst war between a former Soviet
republic and Russia. After a long series of escalating dis-
putes with the South Ossetians, the Georgian government
decided to invade the territory on August 7, 2008. This11 Nygren Bertil, The Rebuilding of Greater Russia: Putin's Foreign Policy
toward the CIS Countries. New York: Routledge, 2008, 121e122.
12 A ﬁrst, small commitment of Georgian forces had been made by
Shevardnadze shortly before his ouster.
13 Liklikadze, Koba, “Iraq: As Third Largest Contingent, Georgia Hopes to
Show its Worth,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty News, September 10,
2007 (accessed at www.rferl.org).
14 “Tbilisi Ofﬁcials Name Street After Bush,” Associated Press, September
14, 2005.
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inforcements, drove the Georgians back, and even occupied
more Georgian territory.15
As we shall see, each step in Georgia's deﬁant policy was
matched by a further tightening of Russian economic
sanctions in a variety of areas. In the end, when those
sanctions failed to alter Saakashvili's policies, it became
increasingly clear that Moscow's aimwas to drive him from
power.3. Energy sanctions
During President Saakashvili's ﬁrst term, from 2004 to
2008, perhaps the most visible economic sanctions
imposed by Russia were in the area of energy supplies.
Since 2000, under Presidents Putin and Medvedev, Russia
has used its energy resourcesdparticularly its huge natural
gas reservesdas a powerful lever to inﬂuence its neigh-
bors.16 This leverage is rooted in the Soviet era, when the
country's Union Republics were knit together by a network
of gas pipelines fed by Russia. With only one supplier, they
had no alternative to Russian energy. This is still true for
many post-Soviet countries. The threat of turning off the
gasdespecially in winterdis a severe one, which Russia
exploits ruthlessly. For example, in 2013 Russia's Deputy
Prime Minister, Dmitri Rogozin, warned leaders from
Moldovadanother ex-Soviet state which has often deﬁed
the Kremlindthat “we hope that you will not freeze” in the
upcoming winter.17 The Baltic States and Ukraine have
faced similar threats, with Kiev seeing its gas supply
temporarily cut off in the winters of 2006 and 2009 and
again in 2014.18 In addition to gas supplies, some republics
(such as Georgia) also relied on the Soviet Union's joint
electrical network, creating a further vulnerability.
After the Rose Revolution brought Saakashvili to power
in 2004, Moscow soon began applying energy sanctions to
the recalcitrant Georgian leader. As with other deﬁant ex-
Soviet states, Georgia was subjected to massive gas price
increases. From 2004 to 2006 the price demanded by15 For more details on the 2008 war, see for example Asmus, Ron, A Little
War that Shook the World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West. New
York: Palgrave and Macmillan, 2010; and Cornell, S. E., and S. F. Starr, eds.,
The Guns of August 2008: Russia's War in Georgia. Armonk, NY: M.E.
Sharpe, 2009.
16 For an overview, see for example Stuhlberg, Adam, Well-oiled Diplo-
macy: Strategic Manipulation and Russia's Energy Statecraft in Eurasia.
Albany: SUNY Press, 2007, and Goldman, Marshall, Petrostate: Putin,
Power and the New Russia. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
17 David Herszenhorn, “Russia Putting a Strong Arm on Neighbors,” New
York Times, October 22, 2013.
18 In its current dispute with Ukraine the Kremlin has again employed
energy linkage, along with other economic threats. For example, in fall
2013 Russia threatened to demand advance payment for all the gas
Ukraine intended to use in the winter of 2013e14 unless Kiev backed out
of signing the EU accord. Such threats worked, and the country's leader at
the time, Victor Yanukovych, refused to sign. Kramer, Andrew, “Chocolate
Factory, Trade War Victim,” New York Times, October 30, 2013. After the
overthrow of Yanukovych in February 2014 the new pro-Western gov-
ernment faced a series of massive price increases and threats, culmi-
nating in a cutoff of gas shipments in June. Neil MacFarquhar, “Gazprom
Cuts Russia's Natural Gas Supply to Ukraine,” New York Times, June 16,
2014.Gazprom, the Russian state gas monopoly, increased by
nearly 500 percent, from $50 to $235 per thousand cubic
meters.19 Moscow tried to portray this as a ‘normal’ price
increase, designed to bring Georgia in line with prices
charged toMoscow'sWest European purchasers, which the
Kremlin described as the “world market price.” Yet the
political rationale was clear. First, price increases were
targeted carefully to states which angered Moscow. Geor-
gia, in fact, was treated the worst of any statedit was the
ﬁrst to be forced to pay full ‘Western’ prices, even ahead of
Ukraine. Friendly states, thoughdlike Belarus and Arme-
niadwere allowed to pay much less.20 Second, there is no
‘world market price’ for natural gas. Since most purchasers
have no alternative but to take supplies via pipeline, sup-
pliers can charge what the market will bear. Some areas
(such as Western Europe) pay a high prices, while oth-
ersdsuch as the U.S., thanks to the recent ‘fracking’
boomdpay much less.
The impact of these punitive price increases on Geor-
gia's budget was substantial. With energy demand quite
inﬂexibledheat and lighting are not optionaldGeorgia felt
it had no choice but to pay. Additionally, as was the case in
Ukraine, the Georgian government found it very hard to
raise prices paid by consumers to try to make up the cost,
since this would lead to political upheaval. So the costs had
to be borne directly by the government. In 2007, at the peak
of Georgia's dependence on Russian gas, the country paid
about $300 million to Gazprom, a signiﬁcant price for such
a small statedequaling about 10% of the entire government
budget.21
The impact of the price increases was heightened by
Moscow's refusal to allow energy loans. In the past, buyers
such as Georgia and Ukraine had been able to obtain gas
very cheaply, because even the low price Gazprom charged
was often not paid. The countries were allowed to quietly
accumulate large debts and delay payments for years
without penalty. Under Putin, this changed abruptly. Pay-
ment for past debts was now demanded immediately and
in full, as was prompt payment for current shipments.
Russia also pressed, as it did elsewhere in the former
Soviet space, for Georgia to sell its gas pipelines to Gaz-
prom. At the peak of Russia's energy pressure on Georgia in
2005e06, the country seemed close to giving in on this
demand. This would have not only strengthened Russia's
inﬂuence on Tbilisi, but also guaranteed gas supplies to
Russia's ally Armenia, which can only be supplied through
Georgian territory. However, in the end Georgia rejected
the proposed Gazprom deal.22
Russia's most dramatic action, though, took place on
January 22, 2006. Just days earlier it had stopped gas sup-
plies to the Ukraine, allegedly over a pricing dispute. But it19 See the chart of gas prices charged to various ex-Soviet lands in
Newnham (2010).
20 Ibid.
21 The country had agreed in late 2006 to import between 1.1 and 1.46
billion cubic meters of gas at $235 per TCM. Source: Liz Fuller, “Caucasus:
Georgia, Azerbaijan Seek Alternatives to Russian Gas,” RFE/RL News,
January 5, 2007.
22 See Papava, V. “Russia's Illiberal ‘Liberal Empire,’” Project Syndicate,
February 28, 2007 (http://www.project-syndicate.org).
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midwinter, was not enough of a punishment for Georgia.
Russia announced that both main gas lines to Georgia had
been cut by bomb blasts, allegedly the work of Chechen
separatists.23 Doubts were quickly raised. Why would
Chechens target Georgia, a state whichwas at worst neutral
in their dispute with Russiadand perhaps covertly a sup-
porter, as Moscow alleged? Although it was never proven,
many believed that Moscow had cut the lines deliberately,
to weaken Saakashvili's government. Georgia suffered
through a few days of closed schools and factories and
freezing homes until gas service was restored.24
Fortunately for Georgia, however, it borders on
Azerbaijan, which had large untapped gas reserves.
Furthermore, the Azeris looked to Georgia as a transit
country for the new BTC line (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan), which
would take Azeri gas to Turkey (and thus West European
markets) without touching Russian territory. This would
allow Azerbaijan to avoid another aspect of Russia's energy
powerdits ability to act as the sole purchaser of gas from
upstream producers in Central Asia. Russia could obtain gas
from such states at rock-bottom prices, because they were
not connected to any other customers, and then resell it for
a vastly inﬂated price to Western purchasers (or former
Soviet republics such as Georgia and Ukraine).25
Starting in 2008 Georgia was able to buy its natural gas
from Azerbaijan, which greatly helped both states and cut
Moscow out of the process. Georgia beneﬁtted from lower,
stable energy prices. Its costs fell by more than half, and
have remained at that low level.26 It also was given
generous transit fees by the Azeris for the gas which
passed through the country en route to Western
purchasers.
Natural gas, though, was not the only area where
Russian energy sanctions could harm Georgia. In 2004 the
country was still dependent on the old Soviet electric
power grid, a vulnerability which the Kremlin was quick to
exploit. In January 2006, at the same time the two gas lines
to Georgia were bombed, Russia suddenly announced that
the main electrical connection between the two states had
also been blown up. This heightened Georgia's suspicions
that the blasts were the work of Russia, since the electric
linewas far from the gas pipelines. It seemed unlikely that a
ragtag band of guerillas could cut all three simultaneously
and so effectively. The electricity cutoff robbed Georgia of a
quarter of its national supply, causing widespread black-
outs.27 In the end, though, Georgia was able to escape from
this Russian sanction as well. The country is fortunate to23 “Russia Blamed for ‘Gas Sabotage,’” BBC News, January 22, 2006
(http://news.bbc.co.uk).
24 C.J. Chivers, “Georgia Reopens Old Gas Line to Ease Post-Blast
Shortage,” New York Times, January 24, 2006.
25 Under President Yeltsin, the Russians were generous enough to allow
countries such as Ukraine to purchase cut-rate Central Asian gas directly,
charging only a small transit fee for the use of Russian pipelines. This
practice ended quickly under Putin.
26 See table “Georgia Natural Gas Price,” US Energy Information Agency
(www.eia.gov).
27 “Blasts Cut Georgia Gas, Electricity Supplies,” CNN.com, January 22,
2006.have great hydroelectric potential, and the Georgians were
able to use that as an alternative to supply much of their
power in the years after 2006. Indeed, presently Georgia is
even able to export electricity to Russia.28
However, another potential vulnerability remained. As
in the gas sector, Russian ﬁrms have made a concerted
effort to buy up key electric utilities in the ‘near abroad.’
Thus, in 2003, the Russian electric giant Inter RAO pur-
chased the operator of Tbilisi's power grid. This seemed to
many Georgians to be yet another avenue for Russian po-
litical pressure.29
In all, though, Russian energy sanctionsdwhile pain-
fulddid not seem to be politically effective, at least in the
short run. They did impose signiﬁcant costs in several
ways: ﬁrst, the direct cost of the price increases imposed by
Moscow; second, the opportunity costs of lost production
from the electric and gas cutoffs; and ﬁnally, the costs of
setting up alternative energy supplies. As David Baldwin
notes in his classic work Economic Statecraft, even if sanc-
tions cannot force immediate compliance, imposing costs
on an opponent is a worthwhile outcome.30 Such costs hurt
the opponent's domestic popularity and limit resources
available for other priorities, even military readiness.
Nonetheless, these costs did not deter the Saakashvili
government from continuing its pro-Western policies.
However, as we shall see, the Russians had other economic
weapons at hand.
4. Trade sanctions
As noted in the introduction, trade was one area where
Georgia's great economic dependence on Russia was quite
clear. Due to the small size of Georgia's economy, this trade
looms far larger for Tbilisi than Moscow. In 2013, for
example, Georgia had exports of only $2.618 billion, while
Russia exported almost 200 times mored$515 billion.31
Georgia's exports to Russiad$190 milliondwere insigniﬁ-
cant toMoscow, making up only one-twentieth of a percent
of overall Russian imports ($341 billion). Meanwhile,
Russian exports to Georgiadalmost $600 milliondmake
up 8.3% of Georgian imports. This is an improvement over
2003, when Russia was still Georgia's largest trading part-
ner. Nonetheless, it makes it clear how hard it is for Georgia
to avoid trade with Russia, while for Russia this trade is
easily dispensed with.
Georgia was assigned a clear place in the Soviet
Union's ‘Socialist Division of Labor’ before 1991. It was
the USSR's region for sun and vacations, for wine and
fruit. Its products were overwhelmingly sold in Russia,
and in turn it relied on Russia for most of its manufac-
tured goods. Georgian-themed restaurants were popular
in Moscow and other major Soviet cities, and Russians28 In early 2014 electricity made up 6% of Georgia's exports to Russia.
“Georgia's Exports to Russia Increase 315%,” Agenda.ge, April 30, 2014.
29 Patsuria, N., “Georgian Electricity System Russianized,” Georgian
Journal, April 20, 2011 (http://georgianjournal.ge).
30 David Baldwin, Economic Statecraft. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1985.
31 Figures in this paragraph from CIA World Factbook and author's own
calculations.
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wine and mineral water. The cold Soviet Union also
lacked other sources for warm-climate products such as
wine and citrus fruits, giving Georgian producers a
favored role.32
After the end of the USSR, however, this tradition of
trade seemed to be a major vulnerability for Georgia. Aside
from Russia, who else wanted Georgian wine, citrus fruits
and mineral water? Similar products were easily available
elsewhere, and other consumers were not familiar with
Georgian brands. As a monopsony purchaser of these
goods, Russia was in a position to damage the Georgian
economy by cutting off imports.
As tensions rose with the new Saakashvili government,
that is exactly what Moscow did. Georgian shipments were
delayed by long ‘customs inspections’da fatal measure for
goods such as fresh fruit. The quality and safety of Georgian
wine and mineral water was questioned. Russia's Chief
Sanitary Inspector, Gennady Onishchenko, claimed that
Georgian wine contained heavy metals and pesticides.33 In
March, 2006, sales of Georgian wine were forbidden on
‘health’ groundsda measure which remained in effect for
over seven yearsduntil, as we shall see, the election of a
new President suddenly made Georgian wine ‘healthy’
again. Similarly, two major brands of Georgian mineral
water were barred from the Russian marked in May, 2006
for “failing to meet water purity standards.”34 Banning
imports on ‘health’ grounds has become a favorite tactic of
the Kremlin, since these actions seem superﬁcially plau-
sible compared to open embargos.35
In addition to ofﬁcial measures, the Kremlin also sup-
ported an unofﬁcial campaign by Russian nationalists to
encourage a boycott of Georgian goods. For example, a May
2006 poster in Komsomolskaya Pravda shows a proud
Russian man refusing a glass of Georgian wine with the
caption “Respect Yourself and the MotherlanddDON’T
DRINK Georgian Wine!”36 This measure can be compared
to attempts to American conservatives to boycott French
wine at the time of the invasion of Iraq in 2003, when the32 These traditions were parodied in a classic joke from the Soviet era.
Because air travel was highly subsidized, Georgian traders could ﬂy
themselves and their ‘checked luggage’ (crates of fruit) cheaply to Mos-
cow, selling the goods for a nice proﬁt. In this joke, a Georgian trader is
hailed as a hero in the Soviet press for subduing an Islamic extremist
hijacker who tried to divert a Tbilisi-Moscow ﬂight to North Africa. Why,
his shocked friends want to know, would he risk his life to prevent the
hijacking? “Because,” he answers, “how the h**l can I sell 250 kilos of
oranges in Tunisia?”
33 Robert Parsons, “Georgian Agricultural Minister in Moscow for Talks
on Wine Ban,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, April 13, 2006. See also
Anjaparidze, Z., “Russia Continuees to Press Georgian Wine Industry,”
Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 3, No. 77, April 20, 2006 (http://www.
jamestown.org).
34 “Russian Bans Georgia Mineral Water,” BBC News, May 5, 2006.
35 For example, Russia in fall 2013 banned Moldovan wine, citing ‘health
concerns,’ to punish that country for agreeing to sign an Association
Agreement with the EU. Similarly, at the same time Russia banned dairy
imports from Lithuaniadsince it hosted the EU summit on November
28e29, 2013, at which Moldova and Georgia both initialed EU association
accords. See David Herszenhorn, “Russia Putting a Strong Arm on
Neighbors,” New York Times, October 13, 2013.
36 Komsomolskaya Pravda, May 5, 2006.French refused to join the U.S.-led ‘Coalition of the
Willing.’37 While that effort, though, did not have govern-
ment backing, the Russian campaign did.
The impact of these measures on Georgia was clear.
Where Russia was once Georgia's largest trading partner, it
dwindled to insigniﬁcance. From 2008 to 12 Russia on
average took only 2% of Georgian exports.38 In 2010 Georgia
exported more to such small and distant countries as
Canada, Spain, Lebanon and Cyprus than to Russia. In dollar
terms, Georgian exports to Russia fell to a lowof $21million
in 2009, barely 13% of the 2005 ﬁgure ($154 million).
The Russian import restrictions not only impacted
Georgia's overall trade balancedwhich, as noted above, is
extremely negative, with imports twice as large as exports.
They speciﬁcally impacted sectors which previously had
depended on the Russian market. Before the boycotts, for
example, Georgia had sent 80e90% of its wine exports to
Russia.39 Replacing that huge market was impossible.
Although alternate outlets were founddfor example,
Ukraine (a key political partner of Saakashvili's government
from 2004 to 2010) became the leading purchaserdin 2012
the overall volume of wine exported stood at only 1/3 of
pre-embargo levels.40 As wine expert Kym Anderson points
out:
In 2005 wine accounted to almost one-tenth of the
value of all goods exported from Georgia, making wine
exports around six times as economically important as
in France, Italy and Spain. Moreover, virtually every
Georgian farm household grows grapes and produces
wine, and they represent nearly half the country's
households and employment andmost of the poverty in
this relatively poor nation in which one-third of the
population survives on less than $2 a day.41
Obviously, then, the Russian embargoes of products
such as wine, mineral water, and fruit hurt Georgian
workersdand would eventually hurt President Saa-
kashvili's popularity.5. Sanctions against Georgian migrants
As a poor Caucasian republic, Georgia has long seen its
young people move to get jobs abroad, then send re-
mittances home to support their families. Like other former37 The boycott of French products seemed ridiculous to some, as when
Republican leaders in Congress renamed the french fries served in the
House cafeteria “Freedom Fries.” Yet it had a real effect: economists es-
timate that weekly French wine sales dipped 26% at the height of the
boycott, with a 13% dip over a longer six month period. Larry Chavis and
Phillip Leslie, “Consumer Boycotts: The Impact of the Iraq War on French
Wine Sales in the U.S.” Quantitative Marketing and Economics, Vol. 7
(2009), 37e67.
38 Source for ﬁgures in this paragraph: geostat.ge, as reported in Nutsa
Tokhadze, “Factcheck: Georgia Tripled the Volume of Its Export to Russia,”
April 4, 2014, http://factcheck.ge.
39 Glenn Kates, “Something Old, Something New: Georgian Wines Adapt
to Changing Market,” July 28, 2014, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.
40 Kym Anderson, “Is Georgia the Next New Wine-Exporting Country?”
Robert Mondavi InstituteeCenter for Wine Economics Working Paper 1301,
January 2013.
41 Ibid., 5.
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sent most such workers to Russia. This was of course
greatly facilitated by the fact that Georgia was linked with
Moscow under both Tsarist and Communist rule. In recent
years, with the end of Communism, this diaspora has
grown greatly. It is currently estimated to be 800,000
strong.42 With only 4.5 million living in Georgia itself, it is
obvious that many Georgians have relativesdoften bread-
winnersdacross the border. As tensions rose between the
countries after Saakashvili took power, this group was a
clear target for Russian retaliation.
In June, 2006, at the same time that the energy and
trade sanctions were underway, Russia hastily expelled
some 2,300 Georgians, after issuing 4,600 deportation no-
tices.43 The action took place at a low point in Russia-
Georgian ties, when Tbilisi arrested four Russian spies
and initially refused to release them. The Russians allegedly
deported any Georgians they could quickly ﬁnd, including
some whose visas and passports were fully legal. The de-
tainees were expelled in a highly dramatic fashion. They
were bundled into Russian military cargo planes with
whatever possessions they could to grab quickly and ﬂown
directly to Tbilisi. A hyper-patriotic media campaign
accompanied the action, similar to the infamous ‘masked
shows’ which the Putin regime uses to humiliate domestic
opponents.44 Three Georgians died in the course of these
raids, and a mother who was eight months pregnant lost
her child. After years of litigation, the European Court of
Human Rights ruled in July 2014 that the deportations had
violated human rights norms, and ordered Moscow to pay
compensation.
Three months later, in October, 2006, the Russian au-
thorities staged a dramatic raid on a Georgian-owned ca-
sino in Moscow.45 They also seized a Georgian-owned
hotel, accusing it of hoarding Georgian wine in violation
of Russian economic sanctions. All of these actions not only
hurt Georgia economically; they also became part of a
campaign by Moscow to portray Georgians as criminals, a
stereotype which was already widespread in Russian soci-
ety. This campaign made many Georgians fear for their
safety in Russia.
Beyond such dramatic actions, the Russians more
quietly tightened the screws on Georgian workers with a
series of punitive actions. Visa rules, for example, were very
easy to manipulate. Requirements could be tightened. Visas
could be delayed, or arbitrarily denied at moments of high
tension in bilateral ties. The same was true of the vital ﬂow
of moneymoving back to Georgia. At the height of the 200642 “Georgian Diaspora Study, 2012.” Economic Policy Research Center
(Tbilisi).
43 Information in this paragraph from Sopho Bukia, “Georgia Wins
Against Moscow at European Court,” Institute for War and Peace
Reporting, Caucasus Reporting Service Issue 743, July 7, 2014, http://iwpr.
net.
44 The ‘masked show’ involves heavily armed masked police wearing ski
masks bursting into the ofﬁces of an offending media outlet, business or
NGO, accompanied by several TV cameras from pro-Putin networks. The
target is thus branded as a maﬁa-like criminal organization, even if no
charges are ever ﬁled.
45 Myers, Steven, “Russian Ofﬁcials Pledge More Sanctions to Cut Off
Cash to Georgia,” New York Times, October 4, 2006.crisis, for example, Russia completely severed postal and
transport links to Georgia for several weeks.46 Even after
the four Russian spies were released, the Russian Duma
announced it was preparing a bill which would bar money
transfers to Georgia.47 Beyond such outright blockages,
Russia could also manipulate the rules and create delays in
such payments at will.
The threat to Georgia's economy was clear. One analysis
estimated that in 2011 foreign remittances made up 8.8% of
Georgia's GNP.48 Remittances from Russia still made up a
large part of that, although the squeeze imposed by Mos-
cow after 2006 had a clear effect. In that year 67% of re-
mittances came from Russia, while in 2011 that had fallen
to 52%.49 Clearly, any serious reduction in remittances can
be quite painfuldthe sudden disappearance of almost ten
percent of a country's GNP would certainly be noticed. The
many families affected can be a powerful pressure group
against the Georgian government.
6. The 2012 and 2013 elections
Moscow's years of patient economic sanctions impacted
the 2012 and 2013 Georgian elections in two ways: First, as
predicted by the classic model of economic sanctions, such
leverage helped to turn the Georgian population against
Saakashvili and his political party, hastening their defeat.
But Moscow also used its economic clout more indirectly,
by facilitating the creation of a force to oppose Saakashvili,
the Georgian Dream movement.
There were of course other factors which made Saa-
kashvili vulnerable. His democratic credentials had eroded
over the years, as his government increasingly seemed to
crack down on opposition parties. This helped to turn some
earlier supporters against himdincluding, interestingly,
Bidzina Ivanishvili, who had reportedly been quietly
bankrolling the Georgian government during the ﬁrst years
of Saakashvili's reign.50 Also, shortly before the 2012 elec-
tion an expose on the mistreatment of prisoners in Geor-
gian jails seemed to make the government look both cruel
and incompetent. Yet underlying economic problems
continued to play a large role.
As noted at the start of this piece, the Georgian economy
is very small and weak. Its GNP per capita, about $6,000, is
only about 1/3 that of Russia and 1/9 that of the U.S.51 Its
ofﬁcial unemployment rate in late 2011 was about 15%,
roughly triple that of the U.S. or Russia, and several percent
higher than when Saakashvili ﬁrst assumed ofﬁce.52
Beyond that, many estimates placed the unofﬁcial rate46 “Georgians Deported as Row Deepens,” BBC News, June 10, 1996.
47 Myers, Ibid.
48 Melkadze, Givi, “Labor Migration and Remittances to Georgia,”
September 26, 2012, International School of Economics, Tbilisi (ISET), www.
iset.ge. For an earlier analysis see Kakulia, M., “Labour Migrants' Re-
mittances to Georgia: Volume, Structure, and Socio-Economic Effect,”
Georgian Economic Trends, October 2007 (http://gfsis.org).
49 Ibid.
50 See Usupashvili, David, “Saakashvili Persecuted by his Own Past and
Not Putin's ‘Accomplice’,” Agenda.ge, October 16, 2014.
51 CIA World Factbook, www.cia.gov.
52 “Georgia: Tbilisi Turns Unemployment Issue into a Reality Show,”
EurasiaNet.org, December 1, 2011.
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reported that 31% of respondents claimed to be unem-
ployed and actively looking for work.53 Many Georgians
could be considered ‘underemployed,’ andmany others eke
out an existence on small subsistence farms. Sectors tar-
geted by Russian sanctions were particularly hard hit. A
detailed 2007 report estimated that in the ﬁrst year alone
(2006e07) Russian sanctions cost the Georgian economy
about $635 million, a substantial amount in a country with
a GNP of only $15 billion.54
Thus, although the Georgian economy did grow overall
during Saakashvili's reign, in the end it was still a losing
issue for him in the 2012 and 2013 elections.55 Many
Georgians did not see the growth in their own lives, with
unemployment and income inequality both quite high.
Many reports stated that the economy was a vital issue in
the election, and Ivanishvili's plan to reduce tensions with
Russia was seen as an important way to improve matters.
As one analyst stated before the 2012 poll, “the economy is
by far the most important issue for Georgian voters,” with
unemployment as the most important economic issue.56
Similarly, The Economist noted before the 2013 presiden-
tial election that “opinion polls show jobs are still the main
concern for ordinary Georgians” and that voters had “high
expectations of economic change” if the Georgian Dream
coalition won.57 Not surprisingly, the opposition put
addressing joblessness at the top of its platform, and ana-
lysts noted that the unemployed were particularly strong
supporters of Georgian Dream.58 Many voters also saw a
link between the economy and relations with Russia. As the
New York Times noted in reporting on the 2012 election,
Ivanishvili “suggested that he would take a more concilia-
tory line [toward Moscow] and Russian markets would
reopen to Georgian produce, wine and mineral water,
providing an economic lift.”59
Bidzina Ivanishvili, the billionaire who formed Georgian
Dream, is sometimes derided as a “Russian stooge” by his
political opponents. This seems greatly exaggerated. As was
noted above, he initially seemed supportive of the Rose
Revolution. And he, too, has now run afoul of the Kremlin-
dby continuing some of the pro-Western policies of the
Saakashvili era. Nonetheless, a key point in his campaigns in
2012 and 2013 was that Georgian Dream would be better
able toworkwithMoscow than theprevious leader. His own
background helps explain this. Ivanishvili lived in Russia for53 Ibid.
54 Eric Livny, Mack Ott, and Karine Torosyan, “Impact of Russian Sanc-
tions on the Georgian Economy,” International School of Economics in
Tbilisi Research Project, 2007.
55 Between 2006 and 2012 GNP growth averaged almost 5% annually. It
did dip in 2008, with the Georgian-Russian war, and fell 4% in 2009, but
seemed to rebound after that. Figures from National Statistical Ofﬁce of
Georgia, www.geostat.ge.
56 deWaal, Thomas, “A Crucial Election in Georgia,” Carnegie Endow-
ment for International Peace, September 11, 2012, carnegieendowment.
org.
57 “Georgia's Economy: Too Much Uncertainty,” The Economist, August 9,
2013.
58 deWaal, Ibid.
59 Barry, Ellen, “Georgia's President Concedes Defeat in Parliamentary
Elections,” The New York Times, October 2, 2012.almost 30 years, beginning in 1982when hemoved there to
attend college.60 He held Russian citizenship and was
known to his Russian friends as “Boris.”61 His fortune stems
from a range of investments in Russia, a business empire
rooted in the freewheeling 1990s. As cases like those of
Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Boris Berezovsky make clear,
only pro-Putin oligarchs can prosper in today's Russia. In
fact, Ivanishvili's longtime business partner in Russia, Vitaly
Malkin, served from 2004 to 2013 as a pro-Putin member of
the Federation Council, the upper house of Russia's legisla-
ture. Critics of Ivanishvili have also found it suspicious that
hewas able to liquidate his Russian holdings at a large proﬁt
before he formed Georgian Dream. Only oligarchs who
enjoyMoscow's favorare allowed to ‘cashout’ theirholdings
so easily. This would be particularly true for a Georgian.
How, indeed, could Ivanishvili so easilymove a huge fortune
out of Russia, at the same time the Kremlin was imposing
sanctions on small Georgian traders and migrant workers?
Clearly Moscow calculated that ‘the enemy of my enemy is
my friend.’ Anyone with a reasonable chance of ousting
Saakashvili should be supported.
Ivanishvili's success in the 2012 parliamentary elections
in Georgia startled many observers. His movement
emerged suddenly, just a few months before the elections.
He was able to unite six small opposition parties under his
banner and rise to prominence with amazing speed, thanks
to his ample ﬁnancial resources. Indeed, it is difﬁcult to
overstate how outsized his wealth is in a small, poor
country. His personal fortune is estimated at $5.2 billion,
about 1/3 of Georgia's entire annual GNP.62 In fact, ac-
cording to Forbes.com, Georgia is at the top of the world
rankings for economic inﬂuence by billionairesddue solely
to this one person.63 Many observers in the U.S. complain
about the role of money in politics, singling out the inﬂu-
ence of wealthy, secretive actors like the Koch brothers. Yet
clearly, a billionaire in Americadwith an overall economy
about 1,000 times larger than that of Georgiadhas far less
inﬂuence than Ivanishvili.64
Well before the election Ivanishvili had quietly begun to
subsidize Georgian intellectuals, theater companies, and
media outlets, as well as a number of villages near his
ancestral home town. He himself now claims that he has
spent some $3 billion for “social and charitable purposes”
in Georgia.65 This amountd20 percent of the entire60 Details on Ivanishvili's background from Steavenson, Wendell, “The
Good Oligarch,” Prospect, July 21, 2010.
61 Before forming Georgian Dream, he dropped his Russian citizenship,
taking that of France and, later, exclusively Georgian citizenship.
62 Value of holdings from Forbes.com list of world's top billionaires, as of
July 30, 2014.
63 Alexander, Don, “Ex-Soviet States Dominate List of Countries Where
Billionaires Have Most Control,” Forbes.com, March 14, 2014.
64 Alexander, Ibid., notes that while Ivanishvili's fortune equals 32% of
the entire Georgian economy, all 492 billionaires in the U.S. together hold
only 14% of the American economy.
65 Ioffe, Julia, “Nobody's Bigger Than Bidzina,” Forbes, March 7, 2012. Her
article shows that the entire region around Chorvila, Ivanishvili's birth-
place, is run as a “ﬁefdom” by the billionaire. He has built 40 schools, a
hospital, and housing for most residents, and provides jobs and stipends
to all sick or disabled residents as well as to “families with many
children.”
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victory in 2012. As we shall see, Ivanishvili used his wealth
even more directly in the 2013 Presidential campaign.
In sum, voters faced two powerful economic factors
which propelled them to Georgian Dream: the ‘pull’ of the
lure of Ivanishvili's wealth, and what it could do for their
lives; and the ‘push’ of the failure of Saakashvili's team-
ddespite good GNP growthdto help most working-class
Georgians. The result was seen clearly in the 2012 and
2013 elections.
In the 2012 parliamentary poll, Ivanishvili's party won a
surprisingly decisive victory, capturing 55% of the vote to
40% for Saakashvili's UNM. Most polls leading up to the
voting still showed the UNM in the lead.66 Reportedly, the
main concern in Saakashvili's camp in the weeks before the
poll was how to cope with demonstrations by disappointed
Georgian Dream supporters after their defeat was
announced.67 However, in the end Ivanishvili's forces
captured 85 of the 150 seats in parliament, to 65 for the
UNM. This allowed Ivanishvili to easily win election as the
new PrimeMinister, a positionwhich was greatly increased
in importance by constitutional changes made before the
election. President Saakashvili was thus left as a relatively
powerless lame duck for the remaining year of his term.
The repudiation of the UNM in the 2013 Presidential
elections was even more decisive. With Saakashvili
constitutionally barred from running for a third term, his
party nominated the former speaker of parliament, Davit
Bakradze. Giorgi Margvelashvili, nominated by Georgian
Dream, led consistently in the polls, although there was
some doubt if he would achieve the 50% needed to avoid a
runoff in a ﬁeld with many candidates.68 At this point
Ivanishvili made his ﬁnancial appeal to the voters even
more direct. He announced that he planned to resign as
Prime Minister after the presidential election to devote
himself to running a huge investment fund to improve the
Georgian economy. The fund was to be worth $6 billion,
almost half of the country's GNP, with about 20% provided
by him and the rest by overseas investors he had
recruited.69 However, within days he further stated that if
his chosen Presidential candidate did not win at least 60
percent of the votedenough to avoid any talk of needing a
runoff with his UNM opponentdboth he and his Presi-
dential candidate would simply quit politics, and the in-
vestment fund would disappear.70 Ivanishvili got his wish.
Georgian Dream won over 62% of the vote, with the UNM
candidate managing less than 22%. Clearly, the Saakashvili
era was over. The Rose Revolution had wilted.66 Kathleen Frankovic, “Polling and Democracy in Georgia,” Open Society
Foundation, July 9, 2013.
67 “Georgian Politics: A Stunning Victory,” The Economist, October 6,
2012.
68 According to the website of the Georgian electoral commission there
were 23 names on the presidential ballot. (http://www.results.cec.gov.ge/
eng/).
69 “Georgia's Billionaire PM Launches $6 Billion Fund,” September 30,
2013, www.eurasianet.org.
70 Lomsadze, Giorgi, “Pouting Power: Georgian Dream Will Abandon
Presidential Runoff if Results “Disappoint” PM,” October 18, 2013, www.
eurasianet.org.7. Positive and negative economic linkage in a new
era
The victory of the Georgian Dream coalition in the 2012
and 2013 elections certainly did not mark the end of Rus-
sia's use of economic leverage in Georgia. Indeed, the
Kremlin's success in helping to depose the Saakashvili
regimedlike its success in ousting Victor Yushchenko in
Ukraine in 2010dlikely only encouraged further meddling.
This has become clear to the new Georgian leaders over the
past two years.
Initially, Ivanishvili and his government had high hopes
of being able to improve relations with Moscow. Naturally,
the departure of Saakashvili made any successor appear
positive from Moscow's perspective. And Ivanishvili, with
his close personal ties to Russia, seemed to be a good
partner. Russian leaders were quick to welcome Georgian
Dream's 2012 election victory. Prime Minister Medvedev
said “We can only welcome this [election result], as it
means there will be more constructive and responsible
forces in parliament,” and the Russian ForeignMinistry said
Saakashvili's defeat could allow the “normalization” of ties
and establishment of “constructive and respectful
relations.”71
Both sides discussed the possibility of opening diplo-
matic ties, and Moscow began to loosen its economic
strictures. On June 15, 2013, after a seven-year hiatus, the
ﬁrst batch of Georgian wine crossed the Russian border.72
Suddenly, the allegations that Georgian wine contained
“heavy metals and pesticides” were forgotten. Georgian
mineral water was also suddenly discovered to pose no
health problems. In all, Georgian exports to Russia rose by
an impressive 315% in 2013, bringing in an additional $150
million in income to Georgiada large amount for such a
small country.73 The previously embargoed wine, mineral
water, and citrus industries led the way, with wine alone
bringing in almost $60 million in sales. Even in the previ-
ously frozen energy sector movement seemed to set in. To
the surprise of many, Ivanishvili's Energy Minister revealed
that he was thinking of resuming gas imports from Russia,
which would give Georgia two sources of supply.74
Similarly, Russian visa restrictions on Georgia were
being reconsidered. Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister, Gri-
gory Karasin, was quoted as saying that “dialogue on easing
visa conditions continues, and we are thinking over
extending the number of those people who obtain visas…
and to make it more ﬂexible.”75 Surprisingly, President
Putin himself went even further: on December 19, 2013 he71 Cited in Alana Goodman, “The Georgian Election and Democracy,”
Commentary, October 3, 2012.
72 “Russia Receives First Batch of Georgian Wine After Seven Year
Break,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (www.rferl.org).
73 “Georgia's Exports to Russia Increase 315%” Agenda.ge, April 30, 2014
(agenda.ge/news/13266/eng).
74 Jackson, Alex, “Georgia Looks Longingly for New Gass Suppliers,”
Natural Gas Europe, June 3, 2013. In the face of public disapproval, how-
ever, Georgia backed away from these plans.
75 “Russian Deputy FM: Moscow Mulls Easing Visa Rules for Georgia,”
Civil.Ge: Daily News Online, June 13, 2013. (www.civil.ge/eng).
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free regime” with Georgia.76
Recently, though, the Russians have made it clear that
Georgian Dream can expect to face sanctions as well as in-
centives if it fails to hew to the Kremlin line. This has become
clear as Georgia continues its efforts to achieve closer re-
lations with the EU. In the summer of 2013 Georgia
completed negotiations on a free trade pact with Brussels. In
November, at the Vilnius summit, it initialed a more far-
reaching Association Agreement with the EU. This, in turn,
was formally signedon June27, 2014.Moscowhasbeenupset
over this continued progress, preferring that Georgia coop-
erate with its Eurasian Union free trade zone, along with
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Armenia. Ivanishvili tried to hedge,
inintially expressing his openness to the Russian proposal
while continuing to move ahead with ties with Brussels.
Recent Russian actions havemade it clear thatMoscow's
patience is running out. It has refused to follow through
with plans to lift all sanctions on Georgian fruits and veg-
etables, and has now re-imposed sanctions on some
Georgian wines.77 With the ﬁnal signing of the Association
Accord in June, 2014, the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister
threatened “serious consequences.”78 Analysts noted that
Georgia's very success in resuming trade with Moscow in
2013 had, ironically, created a pressure point for Russia to
exploit. For example, in the ﬁrst quarter of 2014 70% of
Georgia's wine exports and 48% of its mineral water sales
went to Russia.79 Once again, the screws can be tightened
just as easily as they can be loosened.
8. Conclusion
Structurally, Georgia remains in a position of de-
pendency on Moscow. As America's southern neighbors
say, “when the United States sneezes, we catch a cold.” The
same is true for Russia and the ‘near abroad.’80 As this paper
has shown, Russia does not have to rely on only one eco-
nomic lever when trying to inﬂuence the former Soviet
zone. Both scholars and journalists have focused mainly on
Russian oil and gas sanctions against recalcitrant neigh-
bors. However, as we have seen, Russia can also use sanc-
tions related to trade, ﬁnancial transactions, and travel/
migration. Although it is difﬁcult to measure the exact
economic inﬂuence of such a variety of sanctions, it is vital
to attempt to do so. As the cases of Ukraine in 2010 and
Georgia in 2012e13 make clear, Russian sanctions can have
not just an economic impact, but a political one. In both
cases, I believe, sanctions helped to drive opponents of76 “Putin Speaks of Relations with Georgia,” Civil.ge, December 19, 2013.
77 “Russia Reintroduces Limits on Georgian Wine Imports,” Business
News Europe, October 9, 2013 (http://bne.eu). While keeping the Russian
market open to most Georgian wine, Russia cut off exports from seven
producers, again alleging ‘health issues.’
78 Lorasz, Agnes, “Ukraine-Led Trio Signs EU Pacts, Risking Russia's Ire,”
Businessweek, June 27, 2014.
79 Ibid.
80 The comparison between the U.S. and its southern neighbors and
Russia and its neighboring states is a long-standing one. See for example
a classic work from the Cold War era, Jan Triska, Dominant Powers and
Subordinate States: the United States in Latin America and the Soviet
Union in Eastern Europe. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1986.Russia from ofﬁce through electoral means. The details of
the cases differ, but in each case the more pro-Russian
candidates were able to argue “voting for me will bring
back prosperity, because I can improve relations with the
Russians.” For populations tired of conﬂict and economic
disruption, such arguments can be quite effective.
In addition to its relevance for the region near Russia, I
believe this paper is also important for broader studies in
International Relations. In many cases, sanctions are now
imposed on states which hold elections. The old, ‘classic
model’ of economic sanctions calls for imposing economic
pain until the people of a targeted state put enoughpressure
on their government to force it to change its policies. If the
government targeted is authoritariandaswas the casewith
sanctions against Cuba, Libya, North Korea, the USSR, and
Iraq under Saddam Husseindsuch popular pressure would
be seen in demonstrations, even revolutions. But in cases
such as Ukraine and Georgia, governments can be over-
thrownmore quietly, though the ballot box. And, I believe, it
is much easier to motivate people to vote than to revolt,
since the ‘costs’ of voting are much lower. As noted at the
start of this paper, the economic model of elections has
made it clear that economic decline has a direct, predictable
impact on voting results. This is an important insight, which
helps to disprove the sweeping assertion that ‘sanctions
don't work’ which is so often heard in policy debates.
This paper's conclusions could suggest that Western
sanctions can be effective in some cases, when states we
target are at least partly democratic. For example, Irand-
while not fully democraticddoes have competitive elec-
tions representing real disagreements over policy. In the
most recent elections, observers were surprised by the
large margin of victory for Hassan Rouhani, the most
reformist candidate in a ﬁeld dominated by conservatives.
It seems quite likely that Rouhani's victory was inﬂuenced
by popular discontent with Iran's dismal economic condi-
tion, largely due to decades ofWestern economic sanctions.
As is well known, Rouhani's election has resulted in a
nascent detente with the West, with difﬁcult issues like
Iran's nuclear program moving closer to resolution. As was
true in the cases of Georgia and Ukraine, the Iranian case
may prove to be another example of the power of sanctions
to inﬂuence elections.
However, in general this paper's conclusions could be
troubling for the West. The states which the West supports
in the worlddlike Georgia and Ukrainedare mostly de-
mocracies. If they are unusually vulnerable to economic
sanctions this could be a problem. Furthermore, the U.S.
and its Western allies are themselves democracies. If de-
mocracies are vulnerable to sanctions, what does this say
about our own ability to withstand economic pressure?
Currently the West and Russia are engaged in a ‘sanctions
war’ over the Ukraine. Will the West be the ﬁrst to fold?
Suppose, for example, that Russian energy cutbacks cause
economic problems in the EU, leading to the election of
more conciliatory leaders in some countries. Meanwhile, in
contrast, many of the West's competitors are states which
do not hold competitive electionsdsuch as Chinadwhich
may be less vulnerable to sanctions. These contrasting
levels of vulnerability may cause problems for Western
countries in the future.
